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Performance Outcome of Leadership Succession at Foreign Subsidiaries in Japan. 
Does Nationality Matter? 
 
Abstract 
Leadership succession has been an important topic for research and management practice 
because of its effect on firm performance. This study integrates leadership succession and 
expatriate staffing literatures by investigating performance outcomes of leadership 
succession at foreign subsidiaries in Japan. We distinguished four types of CEO 
successors: expatriate followers (expatriate succeeds another expatriate), localizers (local 
manager succeeds an expatriate), local followers (local manager succeeds another local 
manager), and ambassadors (expatriate succeeds a local manager). Our theory and 
evidence from 2,113 firm-year observations, including 521 successions, suggests that 
successor types have direct and moderating effects with contextual firm-level factors on 
subsidiary performance. We extend agency theory by showing that both local and foreign 
subsidiary CEOs pursue their own, unique interests affecting firm performance in 
different ways.  
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When Carlos Ghosn arrived in Japan in 1999, Nissan, the second largest Japanese 
automaker, was on the verge of bankruptcy. Even though shareholders, stakeholders, and 
the press were skeptical at the beginning, Ghosn was able to turn Nissan back into a 
profitable firm within a few years (Froese & Goeritz, 2007). This remarkable success 
made Ghosn one of the most admired foreign managers in Japan. Meanwhile, Michael 
Woodford became CEO of Olympus, a major Japanese camera maker, in October 2011. 
Within the same month, Woodford uncovered and made public a loss hiding scheme in 
Olympus’ past, resulting in his own dismissal and Olympus’ share loss of more than 75% 
of its value.  
These two examples illustrate that newly appointed CEOs can have a strong 
influence on firm performance for good and for bad. In response, a large body of research 
has investigated how leadership succession affects firm performance (for reviews see 
Giambatista, Rowe, Riaz, 2005; Karaevli, 2007). Prior leadership succession studies have 
often focused on the effects of insiders, those from the same firm and/or industry, and 
outsider successors on firm performance (Giambatista et al., 2005; Karaevli, 2007). 
Findings are mixed and recent studies suggest that the effect depends on contextual 
variables such as pre-performance (Karaevli, 2007). Unfortunately, the majority of prior 
research was confined to large, stock-listed American and European firms or sports teams 
(Giambatista et al., 2005). The few studies conducted in other countries suggest that the 
antecedents and mechanisms of leadership succession performance might differ across 
countries (Sakano & Lewin, 1999).  Thus, more research concerning different countries 
and types of organizations is needed (Giambatista et al., 2005). Further, despite the  
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growing importance of international business, no study – to our knowledge – has 
investigated performance consequences of leadership succession at foreign subsidiaries. 
A few studies investigated expatriate staffing at foreign subsidiaries (e.g. Colakoglu & 
Caliguiri, 2008; Gaur et al., 2007; Gong, 2003, O’Donnell, 2000), and found mixed 
results whether expatriate or local top managers have positive or negative effects on 
subsidiary performance. However, these studies were of cross-sectional nature and could 
thus not investigate the performance effects of leadership succession. This study 
investigates the consequences of leadership successions on the performance of foreign 
subsidiaries.  
The present study intends to make the following contributions. First, this study 
integrates expatriate staffing and leadership succession literatures. By integrating these 
literatures, we hope to reconcile previously mixed findings in the leadership succession 
and expatriate staffing literatures. The foreign subsidiary context characterized by 
relatively small firms, part of an international firm network, and global staffing options, 
is an exciting context to improve our understanding of the consequences of leadership 
succession. Second, we develop a more refined understanding of agency theory, i.e. 
information asymmetry and conflicts of interest between owners and managers, in the 
context of foreign subsidiary management. While prior expatriate staffing research 
focused on agency dilemmas between headquarters and host country national (HCN) 
managers (e.g. Gong, 2003), we provide a more balanced view by investigating agency 
dilemmas of both HCN and expatriate managers. Third, following recent research and 
recommendations (e.g. Giambatista et al., 2005; Karaevly, 2007), we further investigate 
how contextual firm-level factors influence the relationship between leadership  
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succession and firm performance. More specifically, we investigate the interactive effects 
of subsidiary age and prior performance with succession types. Finally, we provide 
country-specific information about foreign subsidiaries in Japan, an important economy 
for multinational enterprises (MNE). Currently, there are more than 3,000 foreign 
subsidiaries present in Japan (Toyo Keizai, 2010).  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section reviews 
relevant literature and develops the study’s hypotheses. The third section describes the 
data and measures. The fourth section presents the results. The final section discusses the 
findings, explains limitations, and provides managerial recommendations. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In line with prior leadership succession and expatriate research (e.g. Giambatista et al., 
2005, Gong, 2003), our theoretical framework is based on agency theory and institutional 
theory. As prior research suggests that one single theory is hardly able to fully cover the 
complexities of leadership succession (Peng, 2004), particularly in an MNE context, we 
combine these two theories for an increased conceptual understanding.  
Agency theory, referring to moral hazard and conflicts of interest between 
principals (owners) and agents (managers) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), serves as a 
prominent theoretical explanation within the expatriate staffing and leadership succession 
literatures (Giambatista et al, 2005; Gong, 2003; O’Donnell, 2000). From this perspective, 
potential misalignment and conflicts arise between principals and agents causing 
economic costs. For instance, Zhang et al. (2008) found that information asymmetry led 
to a higher rate of dismissals of CEOs in US manufacturing firms. In expatriate research,  
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agency theory focuses on the reduction of economic incentive misalignment problems 
between the headquarters (as principals) and the foreign subsidiaries (as agents) (Brock et 
al. 2008; Yan et al. 2002; O’Donnel, 2000). Gong (2003) found that MNEs sought to 
reduce agency dilemmas between foreign subsidiaries and headquarters by staffing more 
expatriates in culturally more distant host countries; and that expatriates had a positive 
effect on subsidiary performance, but this effect declined the longer the MNE gained 
experience in the foreign country.  
Another guiding theory in expatriate staffing and leadership succession literature 
is based on institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) covering social practices, 
cultural values and beliefs (North, 1990). North (1990) defines institutions as ‘macro-
level rules of the game’ (p. 27) and organizations to seek legitimacy in the institutional 
environment (Dickson et al., 2004), what can be mapped with ‘legally sanctioned 
behavior’, ‘morally governed behavior’ and ‘recognizable, taken-for-granted behavior’ 
(Scott et al., 2000, p. 238) respectively. It is important to note that inter-organizational 
networks (e.g., between headquarters and top managers of subsidiaries) and competition 
are also driving forces behind an organization’s input, output, as well as beliefs, norms 
and traditions (Dickson et al., 2004; Kimberly, 1981). Organizations are embedded 
within networks, which generate formal and informal pressures of headquarters strategic 
alignments and the need to localize activities of subsidiaries to conform to the pressure of 
a given market (Pfeffer, 1981). Institutional environments as measured by the 
Institutional Development Index (IDI) are reported to be negatively related to foreign 
affiliate performance (Chan et al. 2008). Gaur et al. (2007) found that foreign subsidiaries  
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with expatriate CEOs achieve higher performance in countries with higher institutional 
distance.  
   In the context of foreign subsidiaries, we propose herein that there are four 
distinct types of possible CEO
1 successions: expatriate followers, localizers, local 
followers, and ambassadors. Expatriate followers are expatriates who are sent by the 
headquarters to replace other expatriate subsidiary managers. This succession type is 
common particular among young subsidiaries that are still in the process of establishment 
when control and coordination are important (Harzing, 2001).  Localizers refer to HCN 
managers who succeed expatriate top managers. We termed this type of succession 
localizers because it indicates a strategic change in regard to localizing the top 
management position. Local followers refer to HCN managers who succeed other HCN 
managers. Ambassadors are those expatriates who succeed HCN managers and thus 
reverse the localization of staffing. 
Prior leadership succession research often distinguished between inside (same 
industry and/or firm) and outside successions. Outside successors were found to initiate 
more strategic change than inside followers (Giambatista et al, 2005); however, the 
effects on firm performance have been mixed (Karaevli, 2007). Shen and Cannella (2002) 
further increased our understanding by distinguishing inside successors into followers, 
those appointed after regular retirement of their predecessors, and contenders, those 
appointed after CEOs were dismissed. We applied the concept of inside and outside 
successors to the foreign subsidiary context. We created a two-by-two matrix to 
comprehend inside and outside status of successors (see Table 1). On the vertical axis, we 
                                                 
1 We use the term CEO and refer by this to the top managerial position within the foreign subsidiary. 
Depending on the firm, other terms such as general manager, managing director, country head, and 
president, are sometimes used to describe the same position.   
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depicted expatriate and HCN managers, and on the horizontal axis we depicted 
headquarters and global linkages versus foreign subsidiary and local stakeholders. In this 
classification, expatriate and HCN managers are both insiders and outsiders at the same 
time depending on the relevant constituencies. HCN managers are usually insiders within 
the foreign subsidiaries in their home country and well connected with local stakeholders, 
e.g. employees, while being outsiders from the headquarters perspective. In contrast, 
expatriate managers might be insiders from the headquarters’ perspective, and better able 
to communicate and coordinate with the headquarters (Harzing, 2001), while being an 
outsider from the foreign subsidiary perspective. Given that localizers and ambassadors 
indicate a change in staffing of the foreign subsidiary, we would expect more changes 
associated with these two types of successors in contrast to the other two successor types. 
 
(Insert Table 1 around here) 
 
This complex and challenging situation is likely to create various impacts of 
leadership succession on foreign subsidiary performance. We expected each leadership 
succession type to have a direct and moderating influence with firm-contextual factors on 
subsidiary performance. We focused on prior performance and subsidiary age as firm-
contextual factors because these two factors were found to be particular relevant in 
leadership succession and expatriate staffing literature, respectively (Gong, 2003; 
Karaevli, 2007; Sekiguchi et al., 2011). Based on agency theory, institutional theory and 
the insider-outside debate we propose the following conceptual framework (see Figure 1). 




(Insert Figure 1 around here) 
 
Hypotheses development 
In line with agency theory extensions in the expatriate staffing context (Brock et al., 2008; 
Yan et al., 2002; O’Donnel, 2000Gong, 2003), we would expect HCN subsidiary CEOs 
to be less able to coordinate with and absorb knowledge from the headquarters and 
international network of the MNE. Since transfer of knowledge from headquarters and 
internal flows of goods and investments to the foreign subsidiary are important to reduce 
cost and increase sales of the foreign subsidiary, HCN successors, localizers and local 
followers alike, are expected to be associated with lower performance.  
If MNEs appoint localizers to head the foreign subsidiary this signals a change in 
strategy. Employees of the foreign subsidiary might have increased expectations and 
more demands toward localizers, e.g. demand for better working conditions. Localizers in 
turn might feel more obliged to local stakeholders, e.g. employees and local suppliers, 
than to the headquarters in a foreign country. These pressures might lead to misalignment 
problems between the localizer and the headquarters (Gong, 2003), and lower subsidiary 
performance eventually. We argue for institutional inertia and expect negative 
performance consequences if MNEs continue the same staffing strategy by appointing a 
local follower. From an agency perspective, we would expect that each continuous local 
follower successor will weaken the link with the headquarters and thus result in lower 





Hypothesis 1a: Localizer successors will be negatively associated with foreign 
subsidiary performance. 
Hypothesis 1b: Local follower successors will be negatively associated with 
foreign subsidiary performance. 
 
Prior expatriate staffing studies argued that multinational enterprises often send 
expatriates to overseas subsidiaries for control and coordination purposes because they 
are familiar with the culture and management practices of the headquarters (O’Donnell, 
2000; Yan et al., 2002; Gong, 2003, Harzing, 2001). Under the traditional understanding 
of agency theory extensions in the MNE context (Brock et al., 2008; Gong, 2003), we 
would assume to have higher performance after the succession of an expatriate CEO 
either by replacing another expatriate CEO (expatriate followers) or a local CEO 
(ambassadors). However, we argue that also expatriate managers are associated with 
agency dilemmas for two reasons.  
First, expatriate managers might have short-term orientations and thus avoid any 
major risks and investments because their term at the foreign subsidiary is usually limited 
to three to five years. Imagine an American expatriate would be dispatched for three 
years to the Japanese subsidiary. During the first 12 to 18 months the expatriate needs to 
adjust to the foreign environment and during the last six to 12 months the expatriate 
needs to prepare the return to the headquarters. Thus, such an expatriate manager can 
only devote six to 12 months fully to managing the subsidiary. Under these circumstances,  
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it is understandable that expatriate CEOs prefer to avoid any major and long-term 
decisions because they only bear the risks but are unlikely to reap the long-term benefits.  
Second, rooted in institutional distance, expatriate CEOs may face liabilities of 
foreignness (Zaheer, 1994), i.e. lack of local knowledge and acceptance. Even if 
expatriate CEOs intend to implement major strategic decisions, they might not be able to 
do so due to their lack of local knowledge and outsider status in the foreign subsidiary. 
Due to vast cultural differences, Japan might be a particular difficult place for Western 
expatriates (Froese & Peltokorpi, 2011). HCN employees further might not be willing to 
support expatriate managers (Toh & Denisi, 2007). Senior HCN managers might resent 
foreign follower successors because they would have desired the same position but were 
neglected in promotion decisions by the headquarters. HCN employees might be 
particular unwilling to support ambassadors because this signals a reverse of localization. 
Due to these and general challenges of adapting to a new culture, expatriates often 
perform below expectations and may terminate their contracts early (Bhaskar-Shrinivas et 
al., 2005). Overall, we argue that the disadvantages of being an outsider at the foreign 
subsidiary are stronger than the advantages of being mentally closer to the headquarters 
in determining foreign subsidiary performance. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1c: Expatriate follower successors will be negatively associated with 
foreign subsidiary performance. 





Leadership succession literature argues that it is not only the succession event 
itself but the contextual factors that affect post succession firm performance (Finkelstein 
& Hambrick, 1996; Karaevli, 2007). Therefore, in addition to the direct effects of 
leadership succession types, we investigate how relevant firm-level contextual factors 
influence foreign subsidiary performance. Based on prior leadership succession literature 
(Graffin, et al., 2011; Giambatista et al, 2005; Karaevli, 2007) and expatriate staffing 
literature (Gaur et al., 2007; Gong, 2003; Sekiguchi et al., 2011) we focus on the 
moderating effects of prior performance and foreign subsidiary age.  
If prior foreign subsidiary performance was low, we would expect – in line with 
agency theory - that ambassador successors would serve as ‘firefighters’ and re-align the 
struggling foreign subsidiaries closer to the headquarters. Expatriate CEOs can reduce 
misalignment problems between the headquarters and the subsidiary especially in case 
the subsidiary was unsuccessful in the past with the need for implementing strategic 
changes.  Agency theory arguments would argue that an ambassador would be 
outperforming any other type of successor in this situation. The arguments lead us to the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: If the prior foreign subsidiary performance was low ambassador 
successors will be associated with higher performance. 
 
In contrast, based on of our enriched understanding of expatriate agency 
dilemmas as explained earlier, we argue that a foreign successor, both ambassadors and 
expatriate followers, would further deteriorate performance of low performing  
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subsidiaries. Reasoning for this is that foreign followers would avoid risk taking and tend 
to delay important decisions to their successors. Ambassador successors might further 
face difficulties to overcome HCN employees’ resistance when trying to implement 
necessary change to revamp struggling subsidiaries. HCN employees might resent the 
reverse localization of staffing and are unwilling to cooperate with the new foreign 
subsidiary CEO. In conclusion, expatriate followers might not want to and ambassadors 
might not be able to implement any necessary restructuring to turn the ailing subsidiary 
back to profits. This line of logic leads to the following competing hypotheses (compared 
to hypothesis 2a):  
 
Hypothesis 2b: If the prior foreign subsidiary performance was low expatriate 
follower successors will be associated with lower performance. 
Hypothesis 2c: If the prior foreign subsidiary performance was low ambassador 
successors will be associated with lower performance. 
 
Our second moderator variable is the age of the subsidiary. Based on cross-
sectional data, Sekiguchi et al. (2011) found that subsidiary performance was higher at 
younger subsidiaries when managed by an expatriate managing director. In a similar vein, 
Gong (2003) found that the positive effect of expatriate managers on subsidiary 
performance diminished over time. The other way around, their findings suggest that later 
localization of staffing is related with better performance. Accordingly, we would expect 
that localizer successor would be related with higher performance if the subsidiary is 
older. This would be in line with agency reasoning and the findings of Gong (2003) that  
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it is preferable to rely on local managers after the subsidiary is established. From an 
institutional theory perspective, foreign MNEs are gaining legitimacy by localizing their 
CEO staffing. Gaining legitimacy, in turn, would result in higher subsidiary performance. 
Given these arguments, we suggest the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: A localizer successor will be associated with higher foreign 
subsidiary performance if the subsidiary is older. 
  
After having proposed two-way interaction effects for subsidiary age and prior 
performance with succession types, respectively, we propose some tentative three-way 
interaction effects combining all our main variables. In our three way interactions, we 
turn our focus to two of our succession types: ambassadors and foreign followers and 
investigate their interactive effects with prior performance and subsidiary age on post-
succession performance.  
According to our enriched understanding of expatriate agency dilemmas, we 
would expect that ambassador and expatriate follower successions would result in lower 
performance in older and low performing foreign subsidiaries. That would be reasoned 
by difficulties for expatriate managers to implement changes in older and established 
firms. The older the subsidiaries the more established are organizational routines and 
management practices. Thus, expatriates should face more difficulties to change older 
and more established subsidiaries. Further, they are outsiders both to the foreign 
subsidiary employees and to the foreign culture and usually stay only for a limited period 
of time. Thus, HCN employees might not see the need to accept painful change initiatives,  
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particularly in older and established subsidiaries. Instead, HCN employees may prefer to 
sit out and delay efforts by foreign managers (Froese & Goeritz, 2007). Agency 
arguments would also state that foreign followers would be less inclined to initiate 
change at older firms to avoid potential conflicts. If however, expatriate managers 
implement drastic changes without the support of HCN employees this might result in 
disruptive change. Older firms are more likely to suffer from disruptive change resulting 
in higher organizational failure (Amburgey, Kelly, Barnett, 1993). These arguments lead 
to the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 4a: Ambassador successors will be negatively associated with foreign 
subsidiary performance if the subsidiary is older and low performing.  
Hypothesis 4b: Foreign follower successors will be negatively associated with 




This study analyzed data from Toyo Keizai Gaishikei Kigyo Soran (database on foreign 
affiliated firms in Japan compiled by Toyo Keizai). We included data from 1999 to 2010. 
However, due to the need for performance data three years before and after the 
succession (Giambatista et al., 2005, Karaevli, 2007), we limited our analysis to 
successions from 2002 to 2007. Even though the data base covers around 3,000 firms per 
year, only around 400 firms provided sufficient financial data for each year. In order to 
increase our sample, we included all subsidiaries that provided sufficient data three years  
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before and after the succession resulting in an unbalanced panel data set. Overall, our 
sample includes 554 subsidiaries and 2,113 firm-year observations, including 521 
successions. Among those 554 subsidiaries, 328 (59%) subsidiaries experienced 
successions, and 138 (25%) subsidiaries experienced even more than one succession 
within our six year time frame. The breakdown of the different succession types is 
depicted in Table 2.  
 
(Insert Table 2 around here) 
 
The most common industries are manufacturing (38%), finance and insurance (30.1%), 
wholesale and trade (17.6%), and information and communication (5.5%). Most foreign 
subsidiaries have their headquarters in the U.S. (47.6%), Germany (10.7%), United 
Kingdom (9.4%), Switzerland (5.6%), France (5.4%), the Netherlands (3.0%), and South 
Korea (2.7%). The size of the subsidiaries in terms of employees range from 2 to 33,601 
with a mean of 835.4 and standard deviation of 2,639.2 and have been in Japan for three 
to 121 years (mean = 29.1, SD = 19.4). 
 
Measures 
In line with prior research (Chan et al., 2008, 2011), we measured subsidiary 
performance as return on sales (ROS = Net profit / sales). Due to the lack of data and 
complex accounting practices within the subsidiary networks of multinational enterprises, 
such sales related efficiency measures are superior to shareholder value and return on 
assets data (Chan et al., 2008, 2011). Since ROS can vary greatly across industries, we  
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used industry-adjusted z-scores for all performance indicators, a common procedure in 
recent leadership succession research (Karaevli, 2007). To reduce the influence of short-
term fluctuations and as recommended by prior research (e.g. Giambatista et al., 2005, 
Karaevli, 2007), we used three-year averages before and after the succession to measure 
pre- and post succession performance. Pre-succession ROS was used as a control variable 
and moderating variable and post-succession ROS was our dependent variable. 
  As explained above, we are interested in how the four different types of 
leadership succession affect subsidiary performance. Two bilingual graduate students 
coded the origin of subsidiary CEOs at T0 and T1 for each year from 2002 to 2007, 
distinguishing between Japanese and non-Japanese (=foreign) CEOs. This was easy 
because all the names of foreign CEOs, unlike those of Japanese CEOs, are listed in 
katakana and roman letters in the database. In addition, we paid particular attention to 
foreign CEOs from countries/regions where they also use kanji (Chinese) characters, i.e. 
China, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore, but found the same way of data organization. 
Due to the way the data was provided our assistants reached 100% agreement on the 
origin of the CEOs. To further validate and better understand the origin of CEOs we 
conducted online research on about 100 successors. This additional step revealed that all 
CEOs classified as Japanese were Japanese and that all CEOs classified as non-Japanese 
were non-Japanese. Our additional results further revealed that several foreign CEOs 
were recruited from other foreign subsidiaries of the same MNE, e.g. German CEO of the 
Indonesian subsidiary was appointed CEO of the Japanese subsidiary. We compared 
CEO origin in T0 and T1 and computed four dummy variables for each leadership 
succession type and used ‘no succession’ as the reference category.   
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  Based on prior research (Giambatista et al., 2005; Gaur, 2007; Gong, 2003; 
Karaevli, 2007), we included several control variables that might have an influence on 
post-succession subsidiary performance. We controlled for industry using the Japan 
Statistics Bureau 20 cluster classifications. Potential home country effects, e.g. cultural 
and institutional differences, currencies, were considered in our estimations by creating 
dummies for major countries/regions represented in our data: the US, Eurozone, Asia, 
UK, Switzerland. In additional tests, we also entered cultural distance (Kogut & Singh, 
1988), as a control variable but the results remained essentially the same. For firm level 
effects, we controlled for subsidiary age (years), subsidiary size as measured by the 
number of employees (natural logarithm of number of employees), and invested capital 
(natural logarithm of invested capital in Japanese Yen), foreign ownership (percentage of 
foreign ownership), prior performance (pre-ROS) as explained above.  
 
RESULTS 
Correlations, means, and standard deviations of our main variables of interest are 
depicted in Table 3. Post foreign subsidiary performance was positively correlated with 
prior performance (r = 0.27) suggesting that performance was somewhat carried over. 
Expatriate followers, localizers, and ambassadors were negatively correlated with foreign 
subsidiary performance. 
 




  We conducted random effects generalized least squares (GLS) regressions to test 
our hypotheses because we are dealing with panel data and an unbalanced sample of 
around 400 firms per year. Since the variances of observations are unequal 
(heteroscedasticity) and there is a certain degree of correlation between the observations, 
GLS is superior to ordinary least squares, and thus the preferable choice (Hamilton, 
2009). We conducted several hierarchical GLS regressions to better understand our data. 
First, we only entered the control variables. Second, we added the main effects, i.e. four 
succession types. Third, we added the two-way interaction terms of succession types with 
prior performance. For a comprehensive understanding, we entered all possible 
interaction terms in our analysis of interaction terms. Fourth, instead of prior performance, 
we entered the interaction term of succession type with subsidiary age. Finally, we 
entered all direct, two-way-, and the three-way interaction terms of succession types with 
firm age and prior performance. 
 
(Insert Table 4 around here) 
 
  Results of our analyses are depicted in Table 4. Our baseline model only 
including the control variables (Model 1), could only explain 4% of the variance of post 
performance. When we entered the four succession types (Model 2), the model could 
explain 6% of the variance. In line with hypotheses 1a and 1c, expatriate followers (beta 
= -0.0111, p < 0.01) and localizers (beta = -0.0166, p < 0.001) were negatively associated 
with foreign subsidiary performance supporting our both hypotheses accordingly. 
However, hypotheses 1b and 1d found no support because neither local follower nor  
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ambassador successors were associated with foreign subsidiary performance. From a 
different perspective, we can conclude that any successor, no matter HCN or expatriate 
manager, succeeding an expatriate CEO was associated with lower post-performance. In 
contrast, if the predecessor was Japanese, successors, regardless of their origin, did not 
have a statistically significant impact on post-performance. This seems to partly support 
our argument of short-term oriented expatriate managers who delay important decisions 
and investments and leave those jobs to be done by their successors.  
  When we added the interaction terms of succession types with prior performance 
(Model 3), the model had a statistically better fit than model 2 (∆Wald χ2 (4) = 170.48, p 
< 0.001), suggesting that the moderating effects were relevant. Expatriate follower (beta 
= 0.0266, p < 0.001) and ambassador successors (beta = 0.0279, p < 0.1) interacted with 
prior performance in predicting post-performance, implying that these successors 
accentuated the effect of prior performance. If prior performance was high, expatriate 
followers and ambassadors could further increase post performance; however, more 
critical to our interest of investigation, if prior performance was low these successors 
further deteriorated foreign subsidiary performance. Thus, these finding support 
hypothesis 2b and 2c but reject the competing hypothesis 2a. We further note, that local 
followers could reduce the negative impact on prior performance on post performance 
(beta = -0.0862, p < 0.001). 
  In model 4, when we added the interaction terms of succession types with 
subsidiary age, the model had a statistically better fit than model 2 (∆Wald χ2 (4) = 14.71, 
p < 0.05), suggesting that the moderating effects were relevant. As expected in hypothesis 
2, localizers interacted positively with subsidiary age in predicting foreign subsidiary  
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performance. This suggests that localizers perform more successfully at older, more 
established subsidiaries.  
  Finally, we entered all interaction terms in a complete model (Model 5). This 
model outperformed a model that only included direct, and all two-way interaction terms 
(not shown here due to space limitations, ∆Wald χ2 (4) = 22.70, p < 0.001). Providing 
support for hypothesis 4a, the three-way interaction term of ambassador successors with 
prior performance and subsidiary age was statistically significant (beta = 0.0068, p < 
0.01), implying that ambassadors were associated with lower post performance in older 
and low performing foreign subsidiaries. In contrast, local followers (beta = -0.0055, p < 
0.05) and localizers (beta = -0.0101, p < 0.05) could reduce the negative effect of prior 
performance in older subsidiaries.  
  
DISCUSSION 
This study attempted to investigate performance consequences of leadership succession at 
foreign subsidiaries in Japan. Based on an integrated overview of expatriate staffing and 
leadership succession literatures (e.g. Giambatista et al., 2005; Gaur, 2007; Gong, 2003; 
Karaevli, 2007), we developed and tested a framework based on agency theory, 
institutional theory, and insider-outsider debate how different types of successors 
influence subsidiary performance. Considering the specific context of foreign subsidiaries, 
we distinguished between four different successor types: expatriate followers, localizers, 
local followers and ambassadors. Our results suggest that succession types directly and 






Our investigation provided several intriguing findings that increase our theoretical 
understandings. First, we extended agency theory in the foreign subsidiary context by 
theorizing and showing that not only local subsidiary managers might have diverging 
interests (Gong, 2003) but also expatriate managers, who might have their own agendas 
that are not necessarily in line with the interests of the headquarters. Findings showed 
that any successor to an expatriate CEO, i.e. expatriate followers and localizers, would be 
associated with lower foreign subsidiary performance as measured in ROS. This suggests 
that expatriate predecessors might have a short-term orientation. They might have 
streamlined efficiency by reducing cost through withholding investments into R&D and 
training, and avoided any costly and risky decisions partly because of their short tenure 
which is usually limited to three to five years. This behavior is understandable because 
expatriates would usually only bear the risk but not benefit from any long-term benefits.  
Second, the interactive effects of prior-performance with expatriate followers and 
ambassadors on ROS seem to provide additional support for our argument of the short-
term orientation of expatriate CEOs.  Expatriate followers and ambassadors accentuated 
the effect of prior performance. If prior performance was high they could further improve 
performance, e.g. through cutting cost. However, both expatriate followers and 
ambassadors further deteriorated performance in low performing foreign subsidiaries. 
This suggests that in addition to a short-term orientation, new incoming expatriate CEOs 
may not find support and legitimacy among HCN stakeholders due to their outsider status 
(Toh & Denisi, 2007), to implement necessary change initiatives.   
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Third, the performance of ambassadors who might be sent to re-align struggling 
subsidiaries is particular disappointing because they tend to even cause further decline of 
foreign subsidiary performance, particular in older, more established ones. Perhaps, 
ambassadors face more resistance than foreign followers because HCN employees resent 
the reverse localization. In contrast, local followers and localizers were associated with 
higher performance in older and low performing subsidiaries further suggesting that 
insider status in the foreign subsidiary and country is more important than connections 
with the headquarters. Even though Woodford managed Olympus, a Japanese MNE 
based in Tokyo, his lamenting about his dismissal parallels our arguments and might be 
applicable to ambassadors at foreign subsidiaries in Japan as well: “I’m not superman. I 
can’t change opinion in Japan in such a profound way. That has to come from within.” 
(interview with Financial Times, 6 January 2012)  “I understand why Japan gets tagged 
with the 'unique' label; it is one of the most impenetrable cultures for outsiders.” 
(interview with British Chamber of Commerce in late 2011).  
Finally, even though the direct effect of localizers on post performance was 
negative, the interactive effect of subsidiary age and localizer successors was positive, 
implying that localizers increased performance if the foreign subsidiary was older and 
more established. This finding is in line with agency theory extensions in the expatriate 
staffing context (Gong, 2003) and institutional theory, suggesting that legitimacy, i.e. 
localization of top management, is beneficial for foreign subsidiary performance when 






The findings of this study provide several important recommendations for MNEs when 
making global staffing decisions for their foreign subsidiaries. First, due to the 
detrimental effect of expatriate CEOs on foreign subsidiary performance, MNEs should 
try to localize staffing in foreign subsidiaries. However, MNEs should not act hastily but 
wait until they have established the foreign subsidiary before appointing a HCN as 
subsidiary CEO.  
Second, if MNEs need to appoint expatriate CEOs due to shortage of local talent 
or coordination and control objectives (Harzing, 2001) MNEs could provide incentives 
and organizational support to prevent short-term oriented behavior. In addition, if 
possible, MNEs should extent the duration of expatriate assignments. To reduce 
resistance of HCN employees towards expatriate managers’ decisions, MNEs may 
provide (intercultural) training and incentives to HCN employees.  
Third, if performance of the foreign subsidiary was low, MNEs may consider 
appointing HCN CEOs, particularly in established subsidiaries, because they are more 
likely to improve the subsidiary performance.  
Fourth, MNEs may implement long-term global talent strategies to reduce the 
outside status of expatriate vis-à-vis foreign subsidiaries and countries and outside status 
of HCN vis-à-vis the headquarters. For instance, MNEs could dispatch expatriate 
managers at younger age and lower hierarchical level for development purposes to the 
foreign subsidiary and have them continuously engaged in projects with the same foreign 
subsidiary. Such managers would become experts for certain target countries and 
potential CEOs of those subsidiaries in the future. The other approach would be to  
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dispatch HCN managers to the headquarters and train them to internalize the 
headquarters’ culture and practices.  
 
Limitations and avenues for future research 
The limitations of this study can serve as avenues for future research. First, this study 
only investigated leadership succession at foreign subsidiaries in Japan and is thus to a 
certain degree context bound. Even though we would assume that similar mechanisms 
would also operate in different countries, some of the observed effects could be stronger 
or weaker in other countries. For instance, Japan is argued to be culturally very different 
from Western countries. Gong (2003) and Gaur et al. (2007) found that cultural distance 
can affect subsidiary performance. Thus, the effect of leadership succession on 
performance could be weaker if cultural distance between headquarters and foreign 
subsidiaries is lower. Therefore, future studies should test our conceptual model in other 
countries.  
Second, we only analyzed archival data, as it is common practice in expatriate 
staffing and leadership succession studies (e.g. Gaur et al., 2007; Gong, 2003, Karaevli, 
2007, Sekiguchi et al., 2011). Future studies could conduct survey research to better 
understand the motivations and orientations of foreign subsidiary managers. When doing 
survey research, future studies might want to also investigate the role of leader 
characteristics such as individual values, and cross-cultural adjustment of expatriates 
(Takeuchi, 2010) in predicting foreign subsidiary performance. Furthermore, it would be 
interesting to investigate the perceptions of HCN employees as they can play important 
roles in the success of expatriate managers (Toh & Denisi, 2007).   
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Third, we only investigated six years of leadership succession. Our longitudinal 
approach is superior to cross-sectional analysis of prior expatriate staffing research. 
However, even longer time spans would enable to further investigate the evolutionary 
character of subsidiary development and its interactive effect with leadership succession 
types on firm performance. Despite these limitations, this study provided intriguing 
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Table 1: Status of local versus expatriate successors 
 Orientation 
CEO origin  HQ / Global  Subsidiary / Local 
Local Outsider  Insider 
Expatriate Insider  Outsider 
 
 
Table 2: Distribution of different succession types 
    Frequency   Percent  
No succession   1,592  75.3 
Expatriate follower   142  6.7 
Localizer   51  2.4 
Local follower   261  12.4 
Ambassador   67  3.2 




Table 3: Correlation table 
        Mean  SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1  Adj. post ROS   0.00 0.15 1           
2  Adj. prior ROS   0.01 0.30 0.2725* 1         
3 Subsidiary  age  29.12 19.43 -0.0047 0.0283  1        
4  LN invested capital  7.44 2.17 -0.0464* 0.0167  0.2061* 1       
5 LN  employees  4.96 1.84 -0.036  0.1037* 0.3697* 0.4625* 1      
6 Foreign  share  76.84 27.21 0.0401 0.0225  -0.1648* 0.1356* -0.2322* 1       
7 Expatriate  follower  0.07 0.25 -0.0484* -0.0073 0.0018 0.1741* -0.0318 0.1441* 1     
8 Localizer  0.02 0.15 -0.1153* -0.0276 -0.0011 0.0610* 0.0541* 0.0774* -0.0422 1  
9 Local  follower  0.12 0.33 0.0291 0.0045 -0.004 -0.0405 0.0078  -0.1128* -0.1008* -0.0590* 1 
10 Ambassador  0.03 0.18 -0.0451* -0.0176 0.0045 0.0435* 0.0544* 0.0349 -0.0486* -0.0285 -0.0679*
 Note: * p < 0.05 
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Table 4: Results of GLS regressions with ROS as dependent variable. 
   Model 1     Model 2     Model 3     Model 4     Model 5    
   Coef. SE     Coef. SE     Coef. SE     Coef. SE     Coef. SE    
Adj. prior ROS   0.0402 0.0109 *** 0.0443 0.0109 *** 0.0388 0.0121 *** 0.0466 0.0109 *** 0.0434 0.0121 ***
Subsidiary age  0.0003 0.0003  0.0003 0.0003  0.0001  0.0003  0.0002 0.0003  0.0001 0.0003  
LN Invested capital  0.0008 0.0037  0.0015 0.0036  0.0019  0.0034  0.0019 0.0036  0.0020 0.0033  
LN employees  -0.0070 0.0041 + -0.0066 0.0040   -0.0065  0.0038 + -0.0066 0.0039 + -0.0063 0.0037 + 
Foreign share  0.0003 0.0002  0.0004 0.0002 +  0.0004  0.0002 + 0.0004 0.0002 + 0.0004 0.0002 + 
Expat follower (ExpF)        -0.0327 0.0111 ** -0.0220  0.0108 *  -0.0332 0.0112 ** -0.0232 0.0109 * 
Localizer (Loc)       -0.0580 0.0166 *** -0.0632  0.0162 *** -0.0603 0.0167 *** -0.0630 0.0163 ***
Local follower (LocF)       0.0073 0.0080  0.0082  0.0078  0.0074 0.0080  0.0100 0.0078  
Ambassador (Amb)       -0.0175 0.0144  -0.0184  0.0141  -0.0173 0.0145  -0.0099 0.0144  
ExpF X prior ROS            0.3104  0.0266 ***      0.3025 0.0275 ***
Loc X prior ROS            -0.0337  0.0362        -0.0453 0.0365  
LocF X prrior ROS            -0.0862  0.0255 ***      -0.1313 0.0308 ***
Amb X prior ROS            0.0481  0.0279 +       -0.0470 0.0429  
ExpF X age                 0.0001 0.0005  -0.0001 0.0005  
Loc X age                 0.0027 0.0008 *** 0.0027 0.0008 ***
LocF X age                 -0.0005 0.0004  -0.0003 0.0004  
Amb X age                 -0.0002 0.0007  -0.0005 0.0007  
ExpF X age X ROS                      0.0016 0.0011  
Loc X age X ROS                      -0.0101 0.0042 * 
LocF X age X ROS                      -0.0055 0.0022 * 
Amb X age X ROS                      0.0068 0.0023 ** 
Wald Chi square  27.31 *   51.34 ***    221.82  ***   66.05 ***   263.5 ***   
Degree of freedom  16    20    24     24    32    
Adjusted R-Square  0.0401       0.0617       0.1421        0.0707       0.1451      
Note: Industry and country dummies were included in the analyses but not depicted here due to space limitations. 
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p <0.01, *** p < 0.001 